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Title: 
The Paradox of Stasis and the Nature of Explanations in Evolutionary Biology 
 
Abstract (about 120 words): 
Recently, a paper by Estes and Arnold claimed to have “solved” the paradox of evolutionary 
stasis; they claim that stabilizing selection, and only stabilizing selection, can explain the 
patterns of evolutionary divergence observed over “all timescales”.  While Estes and Arnold 
clearly think of their work as identifying the processes that produce evolutionary stasis, close 
attention to their claims reveal that they do no such thing.  Instead, Estes and Arnold identify a 
particular evolutionary pattern – stabilizing selection as a statistical descriptor – but fail to 
identify the processes that produce that pattern.  This mistake is important; the slippage between 
pattern and process is common in population and quantitative genetics, and contributes to a 
persistent misunderstanding of the nature of explanations in evolutionary biology. 
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The Paradox of Stasis and the Nature of Explanations in Evolutionary Biology1 
 
I. Introduction: Patterns, processes, and the paradox of stasis 
 
 In “Resolving the Paradox of Stasis: Models with Stabilizing Selection Explain 
Evolutionary Divergence on All Timescales” (2007) Estes and Arnold claim to solve a long-
standing problem: why, given the substantial amount of heritable phenotypic variation in most 
populations at most times, do so many populations show so little phenotypic change over 
evolutionary time periods?  More precisely, why, for many of the populations for which 
sufficient data for evaluation exists, is there only a very slight trend towards increased 
phenotypic divergence over vastly increasing numbers of generations?  Using data from 
Gingerich (2001), Estes and Arnold note that average phenotypic divergence increases with time 
only very slowly – by approximately .84 phenotypic standard deviations per million generations 
in the sample studied!  After considering a variety of proposals for addressing this problem that 
have appeared in the literature, Estes and Arnold argue that, on the basis of fairly straightforward 
quantitative-genetics models, only stabilizing selection can explain the observed data. 
 But have they in fact produced an explanation for evolutionary stasis?  Estes and Arnold 
certainly seem to think so – in fact, they claim that “most studies of stasis have focused on the 
evolutionary pattern without investigating the processes that produce that pattern” and that it is 
only through confronting quantitative genetic models with data from the real world that one can 
“explicitly test alternative explanations of stasis” (2007 282).  This move is, however, made too 
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quickly.  The models Estes and Arnold deploy cannot identify processes at all.  Rather, these 
models serve to provide a formal description of the phenomenon to be explained.  As such, Estes 
and Arnold can reject certain kinds of scenarios, and hence reject certain classes of causal 
processes.  However, the set of processes that are not rejected do not form anything like an 
explanatory kind – any number of causally quite different processes can lead to the statistical 
pattern that Estes and Arnold identify as “stabilizing selection.”   
 The difficulty is that while “stabilizing selection” may sound like a causal process, as the 
term is used here, it is really nothing of the sort.  The debate surrounding possible resolutions to 
the paradox of stasis therefore provides an excellent entry into the different ways in which the 
term “selection” gets used (see Matthen and Ariew 2002), the difficulties with treating the 
models of population genetics as explanatory (see Glymour 2006), and the nature of explanations 
in evolutionary biology more generally.   
 
 
II. The paradox of stasis and Estes and Arnold’s “resolution” 
 
 Estes and Arnold note that there have been a number of proposed solutions to the paradox 
of stasis, including at least:  
 
1. protracted periods of stabilizing selection (Charlesworth et al. 1982; Lynch 1990),  
2. genetic and developmental constraints (Hansen and Houle 2004; Blows and Hoffmann 2005),  
3. selective constraints due to coevolution (reviewed in Mayr 2001, chap. 10),  
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4. canceling of “positive” and “negative” evolutionary trajectories over time (Stanley and Yang 
1987; Gingerich 2001),  
5. mathematical artifact (Bookstein 1987; Roopnarine 2003),  
6. habitat selection (Partridge 1978), and  
7. complexities involved with evolution in metapopulations (Eldredge et al. 2005) 
(Estes and Arnold 2007 227, numbering added.)   
 
 Estes and Arnold produce a variety of quantitative genetics models and compare the 
outputs of those models to the data-set from Gingerich (2001).  Selection, in these models, is 
about the relationship between the optimum (fittest) phenotype and the current phenotypic 
makeup of the population.  Directional selection is modeled by an optimum that moves in a 
particular direction, stabilizing selection by an optimum that stays within the current range of 
phenotypic variation of the population, and various “random walks” modeled by an optimum 
which moves according to some randomizing algorithm or other.  Estes and Arnold argue that, 
for biologically reasonable values of such variables as the heritability of the phenotypic train in 
question, the variance of the phenotypic, and the size of the population, the only models that 
match the empirical data are those in which there is strong stabilizing selection for a phenotypic 
trait value that remains bounded within a relatively small zone over every time-scale (the 
“displaced optima” model, 2007 238).  From this, Estes and Arnold conclude that the most 
plausible explanation for stasis is (1) – stabilizing selection. 
 But have Estes and Arnold shown that only stabilizing selection can in fact account for 
the patterns observed in nature?  Not exactly.  Estes and Arnold have shown that the pattern 
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observed in nature matches a particular kind of pattern called “stabilizing selection,” a pattern 
that is defined formally by models with particular “selection” parameters.  The difficulty is that 
while these models are incompatible with certain classes of processes, they are not causal 
models, and are compatible with too large a range of possible causal processes (see Glymour 
2006).  
  
 
III. Stabilizing selection: Pattern or process? 
 
 When Estes and Arnold refer to “stabilizing selection,” they are referring to a feature of  
models.  One way of visualizing these models as an adaptive landscape; stabilizing selection 
becomes a fact about the “shape” of the adaptive landscape (2007 230).  The idea is that under 
those conditions, selection favors a phenotype of intermediate value in the population, and the 
strength of stabilizing selection is determined by the relationship between the phenotypic 
variance in the population and the strength of selection.  This certainly makes it seem like 
appealing to stabilizing selection is to make a causal claim – for selection to favor an 
intermediate phenotype, or for selection to be strong or weak, would seem to involve making a 
claim about the kinds of processes that a population is subject to. 
 However, a closer look reveals that this cannot be the case.  The parameters used in the 
models employed by Estes and Arnold are limited to the “target” phenotype of selection, the 
strength of selection for that target, the population’s mean phenotype and associated variance, 
and the effective population size.  So in these models, anything that produces the same 
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population level pattern is modeled in the same way.  For example, the model of “stabilizing 
selection” can account for cases where there is an intermediate phenotype that is “fittest” 
(stabilizing selection in the traditional sense), where there is heterosis (heterozygotic advantage), 
or where there is frequency-dependent selection; given the correct assumptions, these cases can 
all be modeled with the same parameter values.  In these models, “selection” is not a particular 
process in which some actual phenotypes have a propensity to outperform others reproductively; 
rather, it is a name given to a particular kind of (average/expected) change in the make-up of a 
population over time. 
 If stabilizing selection refers to a particular process, then, the models employed cannot be 
used to test for stabilizing selection, as too many different kinds of processes can produce the 
same patterns as the models.  However, if stabilizing selection is meant to name a particular class 
of patterns, this ceases to be a problem – the models employed by Estes and Arnold succeed in 
demonstrating that the pattern observed matches the patterns produced by the model.  But if that 
is the case, then Estes and Arnold have not succeeding in explaining evolutionary stasis, but have 
instead more precisely characterized the phenomenon to be explained. 
 Estes and Arnold recognize that a number of different mechanisms are compatible with 
what they are calling “stabilizing selection” but fail to take seriously the possibility that this 
might undermine their claim to have explained stasis.  In the next section, some of the different 
processes compatible with Estes and Arnold’s results will be explored, with an eye towards 
distinguishing those processes that might sensibly be called cases of stabilizing selection (as a 
process) from those that, while they might produce similar patterns, should not be so-identified. 
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IV.  Selection, populations, constraints... 
 
 How do the possible mechanisms behind the observed stability fit into the list of 
proposed explanations for stasis listed in section II?  If all the reasonable mechanisms in fact fit 
into the “stabilizing selection” subset, then perhaps the set of possible processes identified by the 
pattern “stabilizing selection” is not so wide as to preclude thinking of that pattern as identifying 
an explanatory class of processes. 
 To take a homely example, consider explanations for the high number of traffic accidents 
on a particular day.  If we find that the accidents occurred following a sudden snow storm, we 
might, reasonably, conclude that what explained the spike in traffic accident was the snowy 
roadways (especially given what is known about slick roadways, the history of accidents in 
snow, etc.).  Of course, every individual accident that occurred is likely different in key ways, 
and it may, in the end, be impossible to specify which accidents were “caused” by the snow on 
the roads, which would have occurred anyway, and what all the other contributing factors into 
any particular accident might be.  But that doesn’t make “the snow storm” any less of an 
explanation for the increased number of traffic accidents.  Here, to point out that “the snow 
storm” does not uniquely identify some set of factors unique to all and only the (excess) 
accidents that occurred would be churlish.  On the other hand, if the day with increased traffic 
accidents also fell on a holiday on which there had historically been an increased number of 
accidents due to, say, an increase in number of intoxicated drivers, claiming that this fact might 
cast some doubt on the “snow” explanation would be reasonable.  While untangling the causes 
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might be difficult in practice, in principle at least the multiple regression analysis would be 
straightforward, and the settling on an explanation (or on a set of explanations) equally 
straightforward. 
 If the class of processes identified by the match between the model Estes and Arnold 
identify as “stabilizing selection” is more like “a snow storm,” it could well be explanatory even 
if the particulars of the selective regimes faced by the different populations vary (as they must 
surely do).  But if it is more like “a snow storm OR a drinking holiday OR...” then the claim that 
it is the explanation for stasis is less compelling.  One way of making this question more precise 
is to ask if in fact the models employed by Estes and Arnold can distinguish “stabilizing 
selection” (#1 in the above list) from the other 6 possibilities that they note have been advanced 
in the literature.  These will be considered in turn; first, however, it is worth thinking about why 
the claim that “stabilizing selection” is responsible for long term stasis is, in some ways at least, 
challenging. 
 
1.  Stabilizing selection 
 Estes and Arnold note that long-term stabilizing selection demands that the target of 
selection not change (much) over very long periods of time;  Estes and Arnold interpret this as a 
situation in which the position of the peak on an adaptive landscape is not changing (or changing 
only within a small bounded area) most of the time.  But this of course presents a problem – why 
doesn’t the peak location change (much) most of the time?  More precisely – why are the 
changes in peak location over very long time periods not much greater than those observed over 
very short time periods?   
Jonathan Kaplan Paradox of Stasis & Nature of Explanation  Page 9 
 
DRAFT: Please do not cite without author’s permission 
 One possibility of course is that the “ordinary” aspects of the external environment (e.g., 
temperature, etc)2 to which the organisms are responding simply are not changing very much.  
But Estes and Arnold (correctly) reject this, noting that “the universality of environmental 
change makes persistence in peak position difficult to accept” (2007 240).  Again, environmental 
change (narrowly construed) over long time periods does seem to be greater than the change 
experienced over short time periods, so the relative stasis experienced by populations would 
seem hard to reconcile with a focus on the most obvious aspects of the external environment. 
 But there are a number of other ways in which the environment experienced by 
organisms might remain stable.  For example, it might be that the primary determinants of the 
selective regimes experienced by organisms are the other organisms surrounding them.  If this is 
the case, then if the biotic communities experienced by organisms remained stable, so too might 
the selective regime.   As Estes and Arnold suggest: 
 
Many lineages experience stable biotic interactions for millions of generations...  
It is not unrealistic to assume that lineages situated in such communities 
experience long-term stability in the position of their adaptive peaks. (2007 240) 
 
If the shape of the adaptive landscape primarily reflects the ecological communities formed, then 
changes in most “ordinary” environmental variables might not change the shape of the adaptive 
landscape because they do not sufficiently change the communities. 
 Of course, the purported stability of biotic communities itself demands explanation.  
Sterelny, for example, argues that while there is substantial evidence in the palaeo-ecological 
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record for the existence of stable biotic communities, there is little evidence that such 
communities exist today.  He states that: 
 
there seems no doubt that recent ecological associations are not stabilised. They 
are not systems held close to equilibrium by networks of biological interaction... 
Flux is the norm. Communities do not have stabilised memberships. They are not 
insulated from invasion nor bound together in co-adapted networks. Responses to 
both biological and physical change are individualistic... “on the community level 
it would seem to be nearly every species for itself”  (Valentine and Jablonski 
1993: 349). 
(Sterelny 2001 457-458).  This, Sterelny argues, creates a puzzle – “What explains the fact (if it 
really is a fact) that a significant array of palaeocommunities were more tightly integrated than 
Pleistocene and post-Pleistocene communities, and how was that integration maintained..?” 
(Sterelny 2001 458-459).  Without an answer to this question, explanations of stasis in terms of 
the stability of communities will be less than wholly satisfying.  But they would still count as 
explanations, identifying as they do a narrow class of plausible processes for consideration. 
 At the very least then, the models that employ “stabilizing selection” in the formal sense 
related to the form of the adaptive landscape can be made to match a number of different causal 
scenarios, a number of different ways in which the environment might not vary.  If Estes and 
Arnold could eliminate the other 6 possibilities, they could justifiably claim to have provided 
some evidence that a process of stabilizing selection – in one form or another – was the best 
explanation for stasis.  But can those explanations listed by Estes and Arnold as alternatives to 
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stabilizing selection really be excluded? 
 
2. Genetic and Developmental Constraints 
 Estes and Arnold interpret the second explanation listed, “genetic and developmental 
constraints” as referring to a lack of “appropriate genetic variation” or to “pleiotropic gene 
action,” and suggest that both can be successfully modeled using very low values for heritability 
(207 236).  But they note that this is an implausible source for stasis given the very high number 
of generations considered (up to on the order of millions) and the fact that for short time periods 
there can be substantial change (2007 239).   
 However, there are other ways of interpreting “genetic and developmental constraints” 
than simply a lack of heritable variation.  For example, the development of integrated, coherent 
phenotypes may place limits on the kinds of changes that any particular trait can undergo in a 
single kind of population.  Estes and Arnold note that the “long-term persistence in the position 
and configuration of the adaptive landscape may be promoted by interactions among characters” 
and that these kinds of “complex phenotypic interactions help to build the genetic and 
phenotypic correlations that create phenotypic integration” (2007 240).  Indeed, Estes and 
Arnold argue that: 
 
Stabilizing selection arises from the interaction between organisms and their 
environment—both internal and external. Stabilizing selection can thus be thought 
of as resulting from external, normalizing forces (e.g., predation, competition) 
together with the internal, stabilizing constraints that abound at all levels of 
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organization as a consequence of  functional interactions. (2007 240) 
 
But if “stabilizing selection” can arise from “internal stabilizing constraints” then in what sense 
can “stabilizing selection” and “developmental constraints” possibly count as different 
explanations for stasis, as Estes and Arnold suggest (2007 227)? 
 Consider the simple case of heterozygotic advantage provided by malaria resistance and 
the HbS allele.  Famously, in areas with endemic malaria, the HbS allele is kept at a reasonably 
high frequency by the balance between its role in providing malaria resistance in heterozygotes 
and its relationship to sickle-cell disease in homozygotes.  But is this really best thought of as a 
case of “stabilizing selection”?  Selection consistently favors the resistant phenotype, and there is 
consistent selection against the sickle-cell disease; there is no intermediate phenotype that is the 
target of selection.  Selection cannot be wholly effective in this case because the trait in question 
is not heritable in the kind of straightforward way that would permit the trait to go to fixation in 
the population.  But that doesn’t mean that selection is in fact selecting for some other trait. 
 Modeled as an adaptive landscape, where points represent populations with particular 
allelic frequencies, it is easy to see that the case of heterosis will be just like the case in which 
selection actually favors an intermediate phenotype.  In both cases, a particular allelic frequency 
in the population will have the highest average fitness.  
 Note too that if one is tempted to argue that in fact in the Hb/HbS case selection does 
favor an intermediate phenotype – one with some malformed and some normal hemoglobin –  
consideration of frequency dependent selection on phenotypes can be used to yield the same 
result.  Consider the “Hawk-Dove” game, a traditional example of frequency dependent 
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stes 
ly different kinds of processes that might lead to stable allelic 
equencies in a population. 
e, Mayr 
le, or the virus 
r mor
selection3.  If we imagine that the Hawk-Dove trait is controlled by a single gene with two 
alleles (h and d, say), such that the hh and hd genotypes are “Hawks” and dd genotypes “Doves,
then selection will maintains an equilibrium of mixed alleles by selecting for a particular 
frequency of phenotypes.  The adaptive landscape will of course be exactly the same (given
correct parameters), and this will still count as “stabilizing selection” for Estes and Arnold, 
despite the fact that in this case there simply is no intermediate phenotype available for selectio
to favor. 
 The models employed by Estes and Arnold, then, cannot distinguish between (some) 
explanations in terms of “developmental constraints” and “stabilizing selection” – what E
and Arnold call stabilizing selection encompasses at least some cases of developmental 
constraints, as well as radical
fr
 
3. Selective Constraints Due to Co-Evolution 
 Organisms that are co-evolving might be prevented from undergoing some kinds of 
evolutionary change because of the demands of the other (kind of) organism.  For exampl
(2001) discusses the interaction between myxomatosis virus and the rabbit population in 
Australia; after some time, the virus had settled into a less-lethal form, and the rabbits had 
developed moderate resistance (211).  But note that both virus and rabbit are limited in the 
evolutionary changes open to them – a change that left the rabbits more susceptib
fa e (or less) virulent, would be selected against whatever its other features. 
 In some ways, this would seem to be simply a more specific case of the stable ecological 
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nderstood as a process that is really about the selection of intermediate phenotypes). 
 
) 
nold present strong and compelling evidence against various kinds of “random 
 
, again, from 
 confusion about just what stabilizing selection, as they understand it, actually is. 
communities explanation discussed above; if that is so, then, by Estes and Arnold’s argument
shouldn’t count as a separate explanation opposed to “stabilizing selection” but is rather just 
another example of “stabilizing selection.”  In any event, the only way to model this given the 
parameters available is as selection for a particular intermediate phenotypic value that doe
change (much).  The models employed cannot distinguish this from stabilizing selection
(u
 
4.  The canceling of “positive” and “negative” evolutionary trajectories over time 
 Here the models deployed by Estes and Arnold do in fact permit (some versions of) this 
hypothesis to be tested.  They found that there were no reasonable values that can be assigned to
the key parameters in their model that permit the models to reproduce the historical data under 
the assumption that selection favors an optimum phenotype that changes (more or less randomly
over time.  There may be room to quibble with the models and the assumptions built into them, 
but Estes and Ar
walk” models4. 
 Part of what this reveals is that there is nothing in principle wrong with taking seriously 
the implications of the models that Estes and Arnold present.  These models can in fact be used
to rule out possible explanations.  If they were able to rule out a larger variety of explanations, 
leaving only one or a very few reasonable explanations left, the claim that they had resolved the 
problem of evolutionary stasis would be reasonable.  The problem seems to emerge
a
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the 
s Estes and Arnold are too quick to reject random 
alks in at least some cases – see note 3). 
at 
 
 
never 
t 
 
5. Mathematical artifact  
 Estes and Arnold are at pains to show that no version of a random walk (see 4, above) 
can explain the taxonomic data.  This is important, because unless the hypothesis that the trait in
question is evolving as a random walk can be rejected, it is difficult to accurately calculate the 
rate of evolution in that lineage, and the possibility of linking short and long time-scale changes 
is much reduced (see Roopnarine 2003).  By rejecting random walks, Estes and Arnold avoid 
problems pointed towards here (but perhap
w
 
6. Habitat selection 
 Another approach to the problem of evolutionary stasis emerges from an argument th
the phenomenon is rather less general than the fossil record suggests.  In “The dynamics of 
evolutionary stasis”(2005)  Eldredge et al note that for a novel phenotype to be preserved in the
fossil record, it “must originate, become established in a local population, and then spread and
increase in numbers across a large geographic area” (136).  So the failure to observe a novel 
phenotype (the failure to observe deviations from stasis) may not be because the phenotype 
arose, but simply because it never became established in a large, wide-ranging population.  
Eldredge et al suggest that this may be due to population structure (this possibility will be dealt 
with in more detail below, at 7), but more simply, a population that is wide-ranging (for at least 
some of its evolutionary history) may be insulated from environmental change by the ability to 
“select” locations with favorable environmental conditions.  A population may not change no
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 the 
hape of the adaptive landscape, but must refer to a 
ther more limited set of causal processes. 
lection 
ns rejoined the larger meta-
odels, 
because the environment (in some grand sense) isn’
actively tracking a particular kind of environment. 
 This explanation – a kind of migration – would of course be modeled by Estes and 
Arnold as an example of an adaptive landscape that isn’t changing, and hence as an example o
stabilizing selection.  But it is worth noting that insofar as we wish to call this an example of 
stabilizing selection at all, it is clearly stabilizing selection of a different sort than the sim
of a wholly exogenous environmental stability.  And again, Estes and Arnold list habitat 
selection as one of a number of alternative possible explanations of stasis.  If habitat selection is
really just a form of stabilizing selection, then it is hardly an alternative explanation.  If, on
other hand, stabilizing selection is supposed to be an alternative to habitat selection, then 
stabilizing selection cannot refer just to the s
ra
 
7.  The complexities involved with evolution in metapopulations  
 As noted above, Eldredge et al. (2005) argue that the phenomenon of evolutionary stasis 
can be explained by the structure of populations.  Essentially, Eldredge et al suggest that the only 
species represented in the fossil record are those that had a relatively large range, and hence were 
likely composed of (many) smaller populations.  In the smaller populations, directional se
could act on particular traits, but, when the smaller populatio
populations (or went extinct), those changes would be lost. 
 The models employed by Estes and Arnold do not take specific account of population 
structure, nor is it at all clear how they could.  In any event, from the standpoint of those m
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xplanation (6), and as such, would be modeled (again) as a case of stabilizing 
lection. 
tives.”  
 
r an intermediate phenotype, and no longer 
ames a class of possible explanatory processes.  
e 
re at 
d that 
the situation envisioned by Eldredge et al is very much like that envisioned in the habitat 
selection e
se
 
In short, the models employed by Estes and Arnold are able to rule out some alternative 
explanations for stasis, but are faced with a dilemma with respect to other possible “alterna
If the other explanations are really alternatives to stabilizing selection, the models cannot 
distinguish between them, and what the model calls “stabilizing selection” is really no such
thing.  If the other explanations are really just more instances of stabilizing selection, then 
stabilizing selection no longer refers to selection fo
n
 
 
V. Conclusions: The Heart of Evolutionary Biology? 
 In “Wayward Modeling: Population Genetics and Natural Selection” (2006) Glymour 
argues that most biologists and philosophers have accepted population genetics as providing “th
core formal machinery for describing and understanding natural selection and the evolutionary 
events it produces” (369).  On this view, the equations at the heart of population genetics a
the heart of evolutionary biology – they tell us what selection is and when it is occurring. 
 If this view were correct, we would be forced to accept that the models employed by 
Estes and Arnold did successfully identify “stabilizing selection” as occurring, and hence did in 
fact provide an explanation for evolutionary stasis.  The fact that they think they have (an
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 al 2007) reveals their 
ommit
 
he 
els 
e 
 
 that appeals to the 
ot do. 
 The solution to the problem of evolutionary stasis still awaits. 
many biologists seem to agree – see e.g.  Hendry 2007, Carroll et
c ment to this way of thinking about evolutionary biology. 
  But if the above is correct, there are good reasons to suggest that Estes and Arnold have 
not in fact produced an explanation for stasis.  If Glymour is correct in arguing that “population
genetics models evolving populations with the wrong variables related by the wrong equations 
employing the wrong kinds of parameters” (2006 371) this should hardly come as a surprise. T
problem is that there is a critical and often overlooked distinction between the formal mod
provided by populations genetics and the causal relationships between particular kinds of 
physical processes, particular traits, and the reproduction and development of organisms within 
populations (see also Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006 esp. chapters 1 and 2).  The former deal with th
statistical patterns produced, whereas the latter deal with the causes generated by organisms in 
their ecological contexts.  Explaining a particular phenomenon involves, at least, appealing to the
kind of causal processes that produce that phenomenon, and that is something
models employed by population and quantitative genetics simply cann
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NOTES: 
 
1 Acknowledgments suppressed for review. 
2 As for example Lewontin (1983/1985) notes, there are deep problems with the idea of an 
“external environment” to which populations of organisms are simply exposed.  However, these 
problems can be bracketed for now. 
3 In competition for resources, “doves” make a trivial display but back down if threatened, and 
“hawks” fight for the resource.  When two doves interact, each has a 50% chance of getting the 
resource without risk, when two hawks interact, each has a 50% chance of getting the resource, 
but a high chance of suffering a costly injury, and when a hawk and a dove interact, the hawk 
always gets the resource.  By assigning particular values to the resources, it is easy to get stable 
equilibrium populations with any hawks/doves frequency one pleases. 
4 But see Hunt 2007, who, employing much the same models but using a different data-set,  
argues that, with respect to size at least, there is substantial evidence for random walks in the 
fossil record (Hunt argues that they are roughly as common as stasis). 
